Our paper is a further contribution to the still very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we investigate the relationships between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation in a multivariate OLS framework. To take into account a possible endogeneity of the incentives provided to managers and Tobin's Q, our measure of firm value, we additionally employ a simultaneous equations framework. The sample comprises 156 Swiss firms for the year 2002, and the compensation data refer to the firms' top management and the board of directors in total. Our results suggest that more intensive product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers and a lower firm value.
Introduction
What are the effects of product market competition on managerial incentives? Do managers work harder when the firm's environment is more competitive, i.e. do competition and incentive schemes substitute each other? And what are the impacts on firm value? While these and related questions are at the heart of an ongoing debate about corporate governance issues, the underlying mechanisms are only partly understood, and there is a serious lack of empirical evidence on these issues.
The effects of competition on incentive schemes and firm valuation are not only interesting from a purely academic point of view. These issues are also highly relevant for public policy makers. During the last decade, there has been an increasing influence of governments and non-governmental organizations on corporate governance rules.
1 As Khemani and Leechor (2001) outline, much of the attention has focused on the firms and the regulations that protect shareholder rights and govern the conduct of management. However, the environment in which business is conducted, such as the degree of competition among firms, entry and exit rules, and the openness of the economy, requires close consideration. Competition is needed for a culture of good corporate governance to thrive. Competition policy helps to increase efficiency, reduce price distortions, lower the risk of poor investment decisions, promote greater accountability and transparency in business decisions, and lead to better corporate governance. Consequently, the design of effective corporate governance rules necessarily has to take into account the competitiveness of markets. While questions about the role of public policy are clearly beyond the scope of our paper, we should keep in mind that there may exist important interaction effects between competition and corporate governance rules.
The theoretical literature on the links between product market competition and managerial incentives can basically be divided into two main strands. A first strand analyzes the effects of product market competition on managerial incentives, but compensation contracts are not allowed to affect competition. While the earlier literature informally argues that competition reduces managerial slack (e.g., Machlup, 1967) , Hart (1983) is the first to formalize this idea by modeling the effect of competition on the agency problems between a firm's owner and a manager. Subsequent research shows, however, that the relationship between competition and managers' effort level is ambiguous (e.g., Scharfstein, 1988; Hermalin, 1992; and Graziano 1 The OECD is about to revise its Principles of Corporate Governance that were adopted in 1999. In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which reinforces the firms' transparency requirements among others with respect to executive compensation, came into power in 2002. In Germany, the German Corporate Governance Code, a similar set of transparency rules that is however not compulsory, has recently been implemented by the German government. In Switzerland, the Swiss Code of Best Practice has become effective in 2002. The authorities of the European Union discuss the adoption of a corporate governance codex. See also Emons and Wanzenried (2003) .
and Parigi, 1998) . 2 While these studies rely on the information effect of competition, which means that competition induced by many firms in the market may give more precision to incentives based on relative performance evaluation, Schmidt (1997) uses the idea that more competition increases the probability of firms going bankrupt. He shows that the effects of competition on managers' effort level and the strength of their incentive schemes crucially depend on managers' outside options. In particular, an increase in the product market competition is more likely to result in stronger incentives in case managers have good outside options. Raith (2003) examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry with free entry and exit affects the incentives for their managers. Such a setup with free entry and exit implies that changes in the nature of competition lead to changes in the equilibrium market structure. His results suggest an unambiguous positive relationship between competition and incentives. The second strand of the theoretical literature on competition and incentives is based on the idea that precommitment to managerial incentive contracts can alter the strategic competition between rivals. 3 Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) extend the literature by considering compensation contracts based on relative performance evaluation. 4 The empirical papers that relate product market competition to compensation are not very numerous and are mostly in line with Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , Kedia (2003) and Joh (1999) . These studies explicitly take into account strategic interactions and the structure of product markets to explain managerial compensation contracts. In particular, they use these aspects to address the relative performance evaluation puzzle, which is the fact that empirical studies do not seem to find any role for relative performance evaluation in incentive contracts.
Another recent paper by Funk and Wanzenried (2003) provides some evidence for Schmidts (1997) hypothesis that the relationship between competition and strength of incentives depends on the managers' outside options. Finally, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2004) study the impact of product market competition on the compensation packages in the US banking and financial industry.
2 Scharfstein (1988) reconsiders Hart's model while relaxing the assumption of infinitely risk-adverse managers. Hermalin (1992) considers additional effects of competition on the agency problem, all of which are of potentially ambiguous sign. Therefore, he concludes that theory cannot offer a definitive answer to the question of whether competition reduces managerial slack. Graziano and Parigi (1998) analyze the relationship between product market competition and managerial effort in a linear principal agent model. While increasing competition stemming from a lower degree of product market differentiation reduces the manager's optimal effort level and the optimal piece-rate, an increase in the number of firms has an ambiguous effect on effort and piece-rate. 3 See, e.g., Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987), and Fumas (1992) . 4 They examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets and show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentive schemes for which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. They find that firms in more competitive industries place more weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. Their study is one of the very few papers that empirically test the relationship between incentives and competition.
3
There is very few empirical evidence on the relation between product market competition and firm value. Griffith (2001) argues on page 1 that the direction of the effect that product market competition should have on firm value is ambiguous: "On the one hand increasing competition lowers firm's profits and thus reduces incentives to exert effort (the Schumpeterian effect), on the other hand it reduces agency costs (or increases the risk of bankruptcy) thus increasing incentives to exert effort." However, the empirical literature is mainly concerned with the effect of product market competition on productivity growth instead of firm value. For example, Nickel et al. (1997) find that product market competition has a positive impact on total factor productivity. 5 Consistently, Januszewski et al. (2002) find for a sample of almost 500 German firms in the manufacturing industry that firms experience higher productivity growth when operating in markets with intense competition. Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) analyze the impact of competition and corporate governance on firm performance for firms listed on the Warsaw Stock exchange. They find that product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other. 6 One exception is Habib and Ljungqvist (2004) investigating the effect of product market competition, as measured by a
Herfindahl index based on four-digit SIC codes, on firm value. They provide evidence that firm value is positively related to product market competition.
The aim of our paper is to contribute to the still very small empirical literature on the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we use a multivariate OLS framework to empirically investigate the relationships between product market competition, incentive schemes, and firm valuation for Swiss companies.
We consider a principal-agent model in a Cournot oligopoly setup. Such a setup not only takes into account the classical moral hazard problem within the firm, which is induced by the unobservability of the manager's effort, but it also incorporates strategic interaction between the firms. The model is structured as follows: At stage one, the firm owner hires a manager whose task is to reduce the firm's costs. At stage two, the manager decides on his unobservable effort level. At the last stage, finally, the firms compete with each other on output markets. The theoretical predictions of the model are threefold. First, the relationship between the strength of the incentive scheme and the intensity of competition depends on the 5 See, e.g., Nickell et al. (1997) for a summary of empirical evidence on the effect of product market competition on productivity performance. 6 See, e.g., Carlin and Horvath (2000) for a summary of empirical evidence on the impact of competition on firm performance in transition economies.
4 absolute level of competition. For low levels of competition, more competition leads to weaker incentives. For higher levels of competition, however, a higher intensity of competition results in stronger incentives. Second, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition.
Third, the effect of competition on firm value is negative, meaning that firms in more competitive environments realize lower profits.
Our data comprises information about firm characteristics and top management's and board of directors' compensation of 156 firms quoted at the Swiss Exchange (SWX) for the year 2002.
In addition, we use three different variables for measuring the intensity of competition on product markets, namely one firm-specific and two industry-specific measures. The firmspecific measure is based on firms' rents from production and other business activities. The two industry-specific competition measures are a sales-based Herfindahl index and an indicator that measures the intensity of regulations for entering a new industry. We use a multivariate OLS regression analysis to investigate the relationship between product market competition, managerial incentives and firm value. Based on Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2004) , we additionally apply a simultaneous equations framework in order to take into account a potential endogeneity problem.
The empirical results reveal that in general a more intense product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the fraction of sharebased to cash compensation. This result is consistent with the first hypothesis of our theoretical model and suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on average. Moreover and consistent with our second hypothesis, we find the positive influence of competition on incentive schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition environment. Finally and consistent with the third hypothesis of our theoretical model, we find a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value for all three competition proxies indicating that a higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers' effort by providing additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation.
The new aspects of our paper are the following ones: It is the first study that provides empirical evidence on the effects of competition on managerial incentives and firm valuation for Swiss companies. Furthermore, our empirical framework based on a simultaneous equations system suggests a way to deal with the potential endogeneity problem between 5 competition, incentives and firm valuation. Finally, our theoretical principal-agent model explicitly takes into account the strategic interactions between firms without relying on the information effect of competition and the relative performance evaluation. This feature of the model allows us to formulate our hypothesis in terms of observable variables, which makes it particularly attractive for empirical tests.
The paper is structured as follows. The theoretical model and our main hypotheses are in section 2. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical analysis is in section 4, and section 5 comprises some robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical model and main hypotheses

The setup
The purpose of our model is to investigate the effect of product market competition on the incentive schemes for managers and the value of the firm when there are strategic interactions between the market players. 7 We consider a principal-agent model within a Cournot oligopoly setup, where the owner of the firm hires a manager to reduce marginal costs. In contrast to other work, our model neither relies on the information effect of competition, nor on relative performance evaluation, which both impose rather strong constraints in terms of observability of certain variables. The model has three stages. At stage one, the owner of firm i hires a manager who has to reduce the costs of the firm. At stage two, the manager provides effort that affects the firm's marginal production cost. The manager's effort decision is unobservable to the owner, who can only observe the cost reduction. At stage three, the owner decides on the output level, profits are realized and the manager gets paid.
Each firm i has constant marginal costs given by (
The manager accepts any contract ( , ) i i α β that gives him an expected utility of at least his reservation utility, which we normalize to zero.
The inverse demand function of firm i is given by (3):
where a, with and 0 a > a , is the size of the market, b is a positive constant, and q c > i is firm i's output. The variable q j is the output of firm i's rival j. The coefficient , with , captures the degree of product differentiation between the products on the market.
The larger d , the closer substitutes the products are. The parameter d is commonly used to measure the degree of competition in a market, where higher values imply a more intensive competition.
To keep things simple, we set b=1 and ,
We further assume that there are only two firms in the market. We are looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Therefore, we solve the model by backwards induction. 8 See, e.g., Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1999) . 9 See, e.g., Graziano and Parigi (1998). 7
The firm's output decision
At t=3, the firms simultaneously choose their output levels. The profit of firm i gross of managerial compensation is given by (4).
From maximizing (4) with respect to and solving for we get the firms' reaction function, i.e.,
If firm i's rival is expected to set a quantity of , the resulting profit of firm i is as in (6).
Simultaneously solving the system of two equations as given by (5) 
From substituting (7) into (3) we obtain the equilibrium price given by (8) and can compute the expected gross profits as given by (9):
The manager's effort decision
At t=2, the manager of firm i chooses his effort level by maximizing his utility given in (2) 
The individual rationality constraint (IRC) of the manager i is given by 
The manager's wage as a function of i β is then given by
The optimal incentive scheme
At the first stage of the game at t=1, the owner of the firm chooses the incentive scheme for the manager. He maximizes his expected profit net of manager's wage, which is given by (9) minus (14). Using ( ) given by (15).
Differentiating (15) 
To find the equilibrium quantity and profit net of managerial compensation, we plug (17) into the corresponding second-stage equilibrium values, which yields the following results:
The effects of competition on the strength of incentive schemes and firm value
How does competition affect the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity β * and firm value?
Following Graziano and Parigi (1998), we use the degree of product differentiation d as a proxy for the intensity of competition. The larger d, the closer substitutes the products are, and the higher the intensity of competition. As to firm value, we look at the profit net of manager's compensation.
From differentiating the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity as given by (17) 
To obtain the sign of this expression, we only need to look at the numerator since the denominator is always positive. Given that a c > by assumption, this expression is positive iff . It follows that the owner of the firm more closely ties the manager's wage to the performance of the company once the intensity of product market competition has reached a certain level. This leads us to our first hypothesis. To understand the underlying mechanisms from a formal point of view, we can look at firm i's marginal gain of reducing its costs, i.e., let us differentiate (9) with respect to :
In a symmetric equilibrium, expression (21) is clearly negative. This reflects the fact that the firm can increase its profit by lowering its costs. To see how the marginal profit of a cost reduction moves with the intensity of competition, which is really our main interest, we go one step further and differentiate (21) with respect to the degree of product differentiation d that yields (22):
In a symmetric equilibrium expression (22) is positive for d<2/3, whereas (22) is negative for d>2/3. A positive sign of (22) means that the marginal profit of a cost reduction, which is a negative value, becomes less negative and thus smaller in absolute terms when d is increasing.
This reflects the fact that the scale effect is dominating and the firm lowers the incentive parameter β when the intensity of product market competition is increasing. The negative sign of expression (22) for d>2/3, in contrast, mirrors the dominance of the business stealing effect: The marginal profit of a cost reduction becomes larger in absolute terms with a higher intensity of competition d, and this induces the firm to give stronger incentives to its manager.
To see how the relationship between the incentive parameter β and d changes with different levels of competition, we go another step further and differentiate (20) 
Expression (23) is positive, which also means that the marginal effect of competition on the incentive parameter becomes stronger with increasing competition. To see this, we only need to look at the square brackets in the numerator since all other expressions are positive. Within the square bracket, the product is always equal to or bigger than 16, since k is equal to or bigger than one and r is positive. Therefore, the considered expression in the square brackets is positive for all values of d (to remember:
). This expression becomes even larger with higher values of k. These considerations lead us to our second hypothesis:
The marginal effect of competition on the incentive parameter β increases with the intensity of product market competition, as measured by the degree of product differentiation d, i.e.,
As to the effect of competition on firm value, we differentiate the net profit as given by (19) with respect to d, which yields (24).
Expression (24) is clearly negative: From before, we know that the denominator is always positive. As to the numerator, we only need to look at the square brackets since all other expressions are positive. Within the square bracket, the product is always equal to or bigger than -16, since k is equal to or bigger than one and r is positive. Since and -8d + 8 is equal or smaller than 8 for all values of d, the expression in the square bracket is always negative. These considerations lead us to our third hypothesis. 
The explanation of this result is straightforward and stands in line with standard oligopoly models. The closer we move to perfect competition in terms of having more homogenous products, c.p., the lower the profits of the firms are.
The hypotheses derived from our theoretical model are subject of our empirical tests in sections 4 and 5.
Data and sample
Definition of variables
Product market competition
In this section we provide a detailed description of the variables we use in our empirical analysis. Similar to Nickell (1996 ), Nickell et al. (1997 and Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) , our standard measure of product market competition is a firm's rents from production and other business activities, Rents, which can be interpreted as an ex-post measure of market power.
The motivation for using this measure is that firms operating in less competitive markets should be able to sell their products well above marginal costs and, therefore, earn higher rents after covering their expenses. We define Rents as profits before interest payments, tax, and depreciation (EBITDA) minus the costs of capital (cc) multiplied by total assets (TA) and standardized by the company's sales (SA):
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The costs of capital (cc) are defined as follows:
where r f is the risk free rate, δ is the rate of depreciation, λ is equal to the equity ratio of the firm, β is the estimated market beta of the firm's stock, and r m is the return to a broad market index. The risk free rate is calculated as the average one month Swiss Interbank Rate over 60 monthly values from January 1997 to December 2001 and amounts to 1.92%. Following Nickell (1996) , the depreciation rate is assumed to be constant at 4 percent.
11 The equity ratio, λ, is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total assets. 12 The market beta, β, is estimated by regressing the firm's monthly stock returns over the past five years on the respective returns of the market as proxied by the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). 13 The risk premium is equal to the average return of the Pictet-Rätzer Index, a broad Swiss stock market index, less the average short-term interest rate (the one month Swiss
Interbank Rate).
The main drawback of this type of measure of ex-post monopoly power is that it is clearly strongly correlated not only with market power but also with profitability, whatever the precise definition chosen (see also Nickell, 1996) . Since we analyze the impact of product market competition on firm valuation and firm value is expected to be positively correlated with profitability, we may obtain a positive bias in our results. In fact, as our empirical results in Section 4 reveal, Rents affects firm value positively. To mitigate this potential bias, we control for the influence of profitability on Tobin's Q by including an alternative measure, the return on assets, into our regression analysis.
In addition to the firm-specific competition indicator Rents, we employ two alternative industry-level measures of product market competition that are presumably not afflicted with this problem. Specifically, we use a sales-based Herfindahl index, Herf, and an indicator measuring the level of regulation for new industry entrants, Reg, as additional proxy variables for competition. Herf is calculated as follows:
where SA ij is the sales attributable to firm i in industry group j, where industry groups are based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX). Each industry group comprises all quoted Swiss firms and not only the firms in our sample. As argued by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , the Herfindahl index can be used as a proxy for product substitutability. Of course, there are also some problems associated with the use of Herf as a measure of market power. First, Herf does not take into account foreign competitors, a problem, which is likely to be especially severe in a small open economy as Switzerland. Second, our classification of industry groups is arbitrary and may not represent anything like the relevant product market for the firms included in the respective industries. 14 Third, actual as well as potential competition influences the market power of firms within an industry and Herf does clearly not take into account the latter. However, Rents is supposed to be much less afflicted with these problems.
Our third competition proxy, Reg, measures the intensity of legal regulations for firms entering a new industry. This indicator is unique in the sense that is only available for Switzerland in this form. It goes back to a study that was commissioned by the Swiss government and is described in detail in Ledergerber et al. (1998) . The purpose of the study was to build a simple indicator that measures the intensity of regulations by law area and by industry in Switzerland. The industry classification includes 32 industrial sectors and is based on the NOGA Industry Classification System. 15 Without going too much into details, the construction of the indicator can be described as follows: In a first step, the relevant regulations imposed by federal law were classified into the five categories Information Rules, Qualitative Standards, Quantitative Standards, Permits, and Implementation by Cantons. This categorization goes back to Ogus (1994) and reflects the strength of regulations, in ascending order, and the implied costs for firms. The category Information Rules is the weakest form of interventions, whereas Permits represents the strongest regulation category. 16 In a second step, the number of regulations by law area and by regulation category was derived. In addition, the industries affected by each regulation were identified. Finally, the indicator was built by first allocating specific weights to the number of regulations by categories, where stronger regulations got larger weights, and then by building the sum of these weighted numbers. The higher the value of the indicator, the stronger is the impact of regulations for firms.
The regulation indicator Reg that we use in our study is a variation of the general indicator as described above. It is based on a smaller set of regulations that are specifically relevant for market entry. The weakest forms of interventions are categorized under Market Regulations, which include activities related to certifications, registrations or type tests of new products.
The second category refers to Permits the firms have to apply for by the governmental authorities. The final category is denoted by Professional Licences, which are a recognized certification of professional capabilities. The higher the value of the indicator Reg, the stronger is the impact of the regulations for firms entering a new market.
Given that these regulations are barriers to entry, fewer firms are expected to enter in highly regulated industries. Therefore, we interpret a high value of Reg as a low intensity of product market competition. Note that we divided the original values as reported in the study by Ledergerber et al. (1998) by 1000. Also, the information refers to the time period before 1998.
We are aware of the fact that this indicator is not perfect, and it is vulnerable to all sorts of criticism. The weighting procedure, for instance, is not based on some objective criteria and is therefore rather arbitrary. Furthermore, the analysis is limited to federal law only, and the considered regulations mainly refer to small and medium companies. Nevertheless, this regulation indicator is still useful in the sense that it gives us some indication about the costs associated with entering a new industry or market, and this type of information is elsewhere hardly available.
Since all three proxy variables for product market competition measure different aspects of competition and, hence, are afflicted with other problems, it makes perfectly sense to include all three variables simultaneously into the empirical investigations. To cope with a potential endogeneity problem related to our competition measures, we use lagged values for Rents, Herf, and Reg. That is, in contrast to the other variables, which in general refer to the 
Measuring incentives for managers
To measure the incentive schemes provided to managers, we use the percentage value of shares alloted in 2002 to the firm's officers and directors in total relative to cash compensation paid during the same year, Sratio. Besides the fraction of share-based to cash compensation to the firm's officers and directors, this paper considers four additional corporate governance mechanisms, which are assumed to provide incentives to managers and therefore alleviate the agency problems between managers and shareholders (see Beiner et al., 2004) . Stocksod is the sum of all shares owned by officers and executive as well as non- Wanzenried (2003), we define CSV as the return on equity multiplied by the market value of equity in the previous period. Stdv is the standard deviation of 60 monthly returns of a firm's stock. Beta is the market beta estimated by regressing the firm's monthly stock returns over the past five years on the respective returns of the market as proxied by the Swiss Performance Index (SPI). CEOP is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the chief executive officer (CEO) is also president of the board of directors and zero otherwise. To control for industry effects, we include 9 dummy variables, labeled Industry, which are equal to one if the firm belongs to a particular economic sector based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX) and zero otherwise.
Finally, our measure of firm valuation is Tobin's Q, alternatively simply labeled as Q. As suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994) , Perfect and Wiles (1994) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Kang and Stulz (1996) , and Loderer and Peyer (2002), among others, Tobin's Q is estimated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the book value of total assets. To avoid that fluctuations in the market value of firms' equity influence our results, we follow Beiner et al. (2004) and Schmid (2004) and compute the market value of equity as the mean of daily observations during 2002. 19 Definitions of all variables employed in this study are also provided in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 Table 2 further shows several other interesting results, which we only briefly summarize:
Officers and directors hold on average 16.5% of the equity of a firm. However, the median of 2.6% is much smaller, indicating that there are some firms in our sample where officers and directors hold very large fractions of total equity. A comparison of these values to the samples of U.S. firms used by Loderer and Martin (1997) and Anderson et al. (2000) confirms that average insider shareholdings are even slightly higher in Switzerland than in the U.S.
However, the median is a lot smaller in our sample and, hence, insider shareholdings are much more skewed in Switzerland. Many other firm characteristics are comparable to those reported by other studies in this area. However, the mean value of Blocko of 28% is much larger than the value of 7.6% reported by Anderson et al. (2000) for the U.S. Similarly, the average value of Outsider is 87.9%, which strongly differs from the much lower values of 54% and 60% reported by Yermack (1996) and Barnhart et al. (1994) [Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 [Insert Table 3 about here]
Correlations
Empirical analysis
Comparisons of firms operating in intensive competition environment and other firms
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating whether there are systematic differences with respect to the variables employed in this study between firms operating in an intensive competition environment and firms which do not. Table 4 presents comparisons of mean and median values between firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median value (noncompetition firms) and firms with a value of Rents below the median value (competition firms).
Most importantly, we find that non-competition firms have significantly higher values of Tobin's Q than competition firms indicating that the lower economic rents, and therefore profits, associated with a higher product market competition outweigh the potential benefits of reducing managerial slack. This finding is consistent with our third hypothesis.
Furthermore and consistent with our theoretical model, Sratio is higher for competition firms.
Even though the difference is not statistically significant at any conventional level, this outcome may provide some evidence for our theoretical findings that the relationship between the strength of incentives and the intensity of competition differs depending on the level of product market competition. In particular, it is consistent with our second hypothesis, stating that the relationship between incentives and competition becomes steeper with increasing competition. in an intensive competition environment experience a higher volatility of profits (e.g., see Raith, 2003) , which, in turn, leads to higher stock price volatility and arguably higher market betas.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Multivariate OLS-regressions
In this section, we investigate the influence of product market competition on Sratio and 
The effect of product market competition on incentive schemes
Since our main interest is to investigate the effect of product market competition on incentive The results of an OLS estimation of equation 4.1 are reported in Column 1 of Table 5 .
Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative coefficient on Rents indicating that a more intense product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the fraction of share-based to cash compensation. Therefore, firms operating in a competitive environment seem to provide stronger managerial incentives because competition raises the marginal cost of poor managerial decisions. Q has a positive influence on Sratio indicating that managers are more likely to accept share-based compensation when their company is expected to perform well. This result is consistent with the findings of Chung and Pruitt (1996) who find managers to hold more shares of their company when they are optimistic about its future prospects. However, in contrast to managerial shareholdings of which managers can freely dispose of after a vesting period, it is doubtful that managers have a significant influence on the determination of Sratio and, thus, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Stocksod is also positively but not significantly related to Sratio. Thus, firms with already relatively high managerial shareholdings tend to pay higher fractions of share-based compensation to their officers and directors. The significantly negative coefficient on Blocko reveals that monitoring by outside blockholders reduces the demand for incentive alignment of managers and directors. This result is consistent with the findings of Agrawal und Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2004) that large outside blockholdings are an alternative mechanism for shareholdings by officers and directors. The same seems to be true for Leverage. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. In contrast, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient, Outsider seems not to be a substitute for share-based compensation. A higher fraction of outsiders on the board seems to enhance incentive alignments of managers and directors by increasing the ratio of share-based to cash compensation. This result suggests that outside board members encourage share-based compensation contracts.
With respect to the control variables only CSV and CEOP have a significant effect on Sratio. (1990) Table 5 ). Again, the coefficient is negative indicating a positive, though not significant, relation between competition and Sratio. All other coefficients are very similar to those reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 .
Consistent with Jensen and Murphy
Since all three competition variables measure different aspects of product market competition, we also estimate equation 4.1 by including all three measures of competition. As the results in Column 4 of Table 5 reveal, the coefficients on Rents and Reg remain negative, but not statistically significant at any conventional level. In contrast to the results reported in Column 24 2, the coefficient on Herf is now also negative, indicating a positive relation between competition and incentive schemes provided to managers. The coefficients on all other variables remain basically unchanged. An F-test for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and the industry dummies) rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero in all four equations and the adjusted R-squares are between 0.204 and 0.318.
As a direct test of our hypothesis 2, we separately estimate equation 4.1 for firms in a high and firms in a low competition environment. We split our sample into two subsamples based on the value of Rents. "Competition firms" are firms with a value of Rents below the median value and "non-competition firms" are those firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median value. Based on hypothesis 2, which states that the marginal effect of competition on the incentives provided to managers increases with the intensity of product market competition, we expect higher coefficients on the competition proxies for "competition firms". In fact, Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 reveal that the coefficients on all three competition proxies are higher (in absolute terms) for firms operating in a high competition environment than for firms operating in a low competition environment.
The empirical results of this section reveal that in general a more intense product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the fraction of share-based to cash compensation. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 and suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on average. Moreover and consistent with hypothesis 2, we find the (positive) influence of competition on incentive schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition environment.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The effect of competition on firm value
To test our third hypothesis, which is to examine the effect of product market competition on firm value as measured by Tobin's Q, we additionally estimate an OLS regression of Q on the three measures of competition, Rents, Herf, or Reg. Since the additional monitoring on managers associated with a more intense product market competition may be a substitute for incentive schemes and other governance mechanisms, we also include Sratio and the four governance mechanisms, Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider into the regression equation. Finally, we include four control variables. Lnassets and Pgrowth aim to control for growth opportunities. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between Pgrowth and Q and a negative influence of Lnassets on Q, because growth opportunities tend to be lower for larger firms. Based on simple valuation models, Q may additionally depend on ROA and Beta. The results of estimating equation 4.2 by OLS are reported in Table 6 . As Column 1 reveals, Rents has a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value indicating that a higher product market competition as measured by a firm's rents is associated with a lower firm value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers' effort by providing additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation. This result is consistent with our third hypothesis. In contrast, Habib and Ljungqvist (2004) provide evidence that firm value is positively related to product market competition.
As Columns 2 and 3 reveal, Herf and Reg have a positive effect on Q as well. However, both coefficients are not statistically significant. Herf measures the market power of the firms in an industry. From standard microeconomic theory it is well known that profits are higher when firms have more market power. As to the level of regulation within an industry concerning new market entrants, Reg, the positive effect is due to the fact that regulations are similar to barriers to entry that protect the incumbents from competition. The positive effect of all three measures of competition is robust to the estimation of a regression equation including Rents, Herf, and Reg (see Column 4).
The coefficients on Sratio, the four governance mechanisms, and the control variables are very similar in all four regression equations. Consistent with the findings of Schmid (2004), Sratio has a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value. The only statistically significant governance mechanism is Stocksod, which is significantly positively related to Tobin's Q in columns (1) An F-test for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and the industry dummies) always rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero and the adjusted R-squares between 0.500 and 0.507 are quite high.
The empirical results of this section are consistent with hypothesis 3 of our theoretical model.
For all three competition proxies, we find a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value indicating that a higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers' effort by providing additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The problem of endogeneity: A simultaneous equations analysis
A possible concern with respect to our OLS results is that some of our right-hand-side variables are correlated with the error term of the respective equation and, thus, that our results are affected by a possible endogeneity of some of the variables included in our regression equations (e.g., see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Beiner et al., 2004) .
To investigate whether our results suffer from an endogeneity bias, we implement a DurbinWu-Hausman test (e.g., see Hausman, 1978; and Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) on the endogeneity of Sratio and Q. The test involves a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, each 27 The inclusion of a quadratic term of Stocksod reveals that the relation between Stocksod and Tobin's Q is parabolic, but leaves all other results basically unchanged. Empirical evidence on a parabolic relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm value is provided by McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Schmid (2004), for example. 28 The finding of a negative effect of the fraction of outside directors on the board is consistent with the results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , who find Outsider to be the only governance mechanism having a significant influence on Tobin's Q. However, they have no plausible explanation for this result. The significance of the predicted right-hand-side dependent variable is then tested using a Ttest with the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.
We report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics with the respective p-values in each
Column of Tables 5 and 6 below the OLS results. In no case are we able to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, suggesting that estimating the equations as a simultaneous system is not necessary or appropriate. However, as pointed out by Johnston and DiNardo (1997) among others, the test results can be inconclusive, first, because the test is designed for large samples, and, second, because it may either reflect that the endogeneity bias of the parameters estimated with OLS is not serious or that the predetermined variables excluded from the structural equations are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables.
Following Cohen and Walsh (2000) and notwithstanding the appropriateness of the DurbinWu-Hausman specification test for a relatively small sample such as ours, we check the robustness of our results by estimating both regression equations simultaneously by 3SLS.
The results are reported in Table 7 Pgrowth on Q is now significant at the 1% level.
To test for the correctness of the specification of our entire system of simultaneous equations, we apply the Hausman specification test (e.g., see Hausman, 1978; and Hausman, 1983) . 29 As the results in Table 7 reveal, the Hausman test statistic cannot be rejected at the 10% level for both equations of our system. Thus, under the assumption that at least one of the two equations are correctly specified, the specification of the system of two simultaneous equations cannot be rejected and hence the most efficient estimates can be obtained by applying 3SLS.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Robustness Tests
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our empirical results with respect to alternative definitions of the competition variables Rents, Herf, and Reg. With respect to
Rents, we employ three additional, alternative definitions. First, we investigate whether our results are robust to the use of 2002 data for the variable Rents, Rents_02. Second, we apply a second measure of Rents based on a rate of depreciation (δ) of 8 percent (instead of 4 percent), Rents8. Following Nickell (1996), we finally apply an alternative measure of Rents where the equity ratio (λ) is set equal to one for all firms, RentsL1. With respect to Herf, we use two alternative measures. Again, the first is based on 2002 data for the calculation of
Herf. The second is based on an alternative classification of the relevant industries and uses "market sectors" instead of "industry groups". 30 Market sectors are defined to be broader than industry sectors leading to a reduction from 33 to 17 industries underlying the calculations of the Herfindahl index. This variable is labeled as Herf_MaSe. Finally, we use an alternative 29 The test statistic of the Hausman specification test is based on a comparison of the 2SLS and 3SLS estimates. Under the null hypothesis of no misspecification, the 3SLS results are consistent and efficient while the 2SLS results are consistent but not efficient. The test investigates for each equation whether the 3SLS results are inconsistent due to a misspecification in one of the other equations. Under 3SLS, the misspecification of one single equation is transmitted to all equations by the use of an inconsistently estimated covariance matrix in the third stage. In contrast, under 2SLS only the single equation that is misspecified is affected by the misspecification. Thus, the crucial assumption of the test is that at least one equation of the system is correctly specified (if this is not the case, 2SLS as well as 3SLS results are inconsistent and the Hausman specification test is not meaningful). If the null is rejected, there is a misspecification somewhere in the system. However, the test does not provide any suggestions about what has to be changed in the system. The Hausman test statistic is distributed Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions (the number of instruments included in the system less the number of regressors in the respective equation). 30 Industry groups as well as market sectors are both based on the classification of the Swiss Exchange (SWX). 29 definition of Reg, Reg_General, measuring not only the intensity of legal regulations that are specifically relevant for market entry but the level of regulation within the respective industry in general.
To investigate the robustness of our results with respect to these alternative definitions of our competition proxies, we reestimate the regression equations reported in Column 4 of Table 5 (Sratio) and Column 4 of Table 6 (Q) by OLS. The results in Table 8 reveal that our results with respect to Sratio are robust to replacing any one of the three competition variables (Rents, Herf, and Reg) by one of the alternatives. The use of 2002 data leads to a coefficient on Rents which is statistically significant at the 1% level. All other coefficients remain basically unchanged. Table 9 reports the results with respect to Tobin's Q. Again, the results are quite robust against the use of alternative definitions of the competition variables. Two exceptions are the negative sign on Rents_02 (Column 2) and the negative sign on Herf_MaSe (Column 6). However, both p-values, especially the former, are quite high: 0.875 and 0.476, respectively.
In general, we conclude that our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions for our three measures of product market competition. However, as already mentioned in Section 3.1.1, our classification of industry groups is arbitrary and may not represent anything like the relevant product market for the firms included in the respective industries. Thus, the finding of a positive coefficient on Herf and a negative on Herf_MaSe may, in fact, suggest that the results with respect to the Herfindahl index depend on the precise definition of the relevant industries.
[Insert Table 8 about here] [Insert Table 9 about here]
Conclusion
Our paper is a further contribution to better understand the effects of competition on compensation schemes for managers and on firm valuation. While the theoretical literature offers some insights on this issue, the picture is far from being complete, and more research is clearly needed in this area. Given that the theoretical models often lead to ambiguous results, it seems especially important to provide further empirical evidence on these subjects. This topic has become even more relevant with the increasing influence of public organizations on corporate governance rules and the general insight that competition is necessary for a culture of good corporate governance.
In the theoretical section we consider a principal-agent model within a Cournot setup where the manager provides unobservable effort to affect the firm's marginal costs. The key features of our model are as follows: First, it relies on neither on information effects of competition nor on relative performance evaluation. Second, it integrates strategic interaction on product markets between the firms. These features provide an accurate description of firm behavior and lead to testable hypotheses in terms of observable variables.
The empirical part tests the main hypotheses of our theoretical model on the relationship between competition, managerial incentives and firm valuation with data of 156 Swiss companies. Our empirical results reveal that in general a more intense product market competition is associated with stronger incentive schemes for managers as measured by the fraction of share-based to cash compensation. This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 of our theoretical model and suggests that firms are operating in competitive environments on average. Moreover and consistent with hypothesis 2, we find the positive influence of competition on incentive schemes to be stronger for firms operating in a high competition environment. Finally and consistent with hypothesis 3 of our model, we find a positive but not statistically significant effect on firm value for all three competition proxies indicating that a higher product market competition is associated with a lower firm value. Thus, the negative effect of lower economic rents seems to outweigh the positive effect of reducing managerial slack and increasing the managers' effort by providing additional monitoring and increasing the threat of liquidation.
While our work provides some potentially insightful results, it also raises further questions that have to be addressed in future work. It would be interesting to look not only at public companies, but also consider small and medium sized private corporations that build the core part of many economies. More importantly, due to the increasing importance of option-based pay it is obvious that Sratio is an incomplete measure of the incentive schemes provided to officers and directors. 31 Hence, it would be interesting to enhance our analysis by using the fraction of share-and option-based pay to cash compensation as an alternative, and arguably more complete, measure of the incentive schemes provided to managers. 32 Also, more detailed compensation and performance data not only from the top, but also from the middle management could be of some interest since some important corporate decisions are taken on 31 Recent evidence on the development of option-based pay in the US is given by Hall and Murphy (2002) This table reports the summary statistics of all variables included in the empirical investigations of this study (Section 4), with the exception of Industry and the alternative measures of product market competition employed in the robustness section. The variables are the following: A measure of ex-post rents (Rents), sales-based Herfindahl index (Herf), level of regulations for market entry (Reg), Tobin's Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), the percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (Stocksod), cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders (Blocko), leverage (Leverage), the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log of book value of total assets (Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in shareholder value (CSV), standard deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP). The data generally refers to the reporting period from January 2002 to December 2002 and the sample size is 156. This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables included in the empirical investigations of this study (Section 4), with the exception of Industry and the alternative measures of product market competition employed in the robustness section. The variables are the following: A measure of ex-post rents (Rents), sales-based Herfindahl index (Herf), level of regulations for market entry (Reg), Tobin's Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), the percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (Stocksod), cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders (Blocko), leverage (Leverage), the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log of book value of total assets (Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in shareholder value (CSV), standard deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP). The data generally refers to the reporting period from January 2002 to December 2002 and the sample size is 156. The p-values are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. This table presents comparisons of mean and median Tobin's Q (Q), ratio of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), percentage of equity owned by officers and directors (Stocksod), cumulated voting rights by outside blockholders (Blocko), leverage (Leverage), the fraction of outside directors on the board (Outsider), log of book value of total assets (Lnassets), return on assets (ROA), average annual sales growth over the past three years (Pgrowth), change in shareholder value (CSV), standard deviation of stock returns (Stdv), market beta (Beta), and a dummy variable whether the CEO is also the president of the board (CEOP) between firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median value (non-competition firms) and firms with a value of Rents below the median value (competition firms). Equality of means is tested using a standard t-test and equality of medians is tested using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The table reports p-values. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Columns 1 to 4 report estimates from OLS regressions of the percentage of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio) on individual measures of product market competition (Rents, Herf, and Reg) and all three measures together along with Tobin's Q (Q), four corporate governance mechanisms (Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider) , and four control variables (Lnassets, CSV, Stdv, and CEOP) . Columns 5 and 6 report OLS estimates for firms operating in a high and firms operating in a low competition environment. "Competition firms" (Column 5) are firms with a value of Rents below the median value and "non-competition firms" (Column 6) are firms with a value of Rents equal to or above the median value. An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Estimates from OLS regressions of Tobin's Q (Q) on individual measures of product market competition (Rents, Herf, and Reg) and all three measures together along with the percentage of share-based to cash compensation (Sratio), four corporate governance mechanisms (Stocksod, Blocko, Leverage, and Outsider) , and four control variables (Lnassets, ROA, Pgrowth, and Beta) . The sample size is 156. An F-test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for two-sided tests. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Results from estimating equations 4.1 (Panel A) and 4.2 (Panel B) simultaneously by 3SLS. The sample size is 156. A Wald test is performed for the simultaneous significance of all coefficients (except the constant and industry dummies). The numbers in parentheses are probability values for twosided tests. To test for the correctness of the specification of the system of two simultaneous equations, a Hausman specification test is applied. The test statistic is distributed Chi-squared and we report the respective 10% critical values. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. 
